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Abstract: This study presents the main features of the Swedish approach for resolving the 
banking crisis of 1991-93 by condensing them into seven policy lessons. These concern (1) 
the importance of political unity behind the resolution policy, (2) a government blanket 
guarantee of the financial obligations of the banking system, (3) swift policy action where 
acting early was more important than acting in exactly the right manner, (4) an adequate legal 
and institutional framework for the resolution procedures including open-ended public 
funding, (5) full disclosure of information by the parties involved, (6) a differentiated 
resolution policy minimizing moral hazard by forcing private sector participants to absorb 
losses before government financial intervention, and (7) the proper design of macroeconomic 
policies to simultaneously end the crisis in both the real economy and the financial sector.  
 
The exportability of the Swedish model of the 1990s to countries suffering from financial 
turmoil today requires a detailed knowledge of the institutions, legislation and political 
conditions in the country involved. The application of these lessons outside Sweden is not a 
simple task, given the major differences between the initial conditions of the Swedish crisis of 
the early 1990s and the present global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the Swedish experience 
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  1 
The Swedish model for resolving the banking crisis of 1991-93. 







The present financial turmoil has focused interest on the experience of how financial crises 
were managed in the past. The Swedish bank resolution policy in the early 1990s has attracted 
considerable international attention, as it is commonly regarded as successful. The purpose of 
this paper is to present the main features of the Swedish model for resolving the banking crisis 
of 1992-95 by condensing them into seven major policy-lessons.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. First, an account of the Swedish financial crisis is given to 
serve as background for the actions taken to salvage the banking system. Secondly, the main 
features of the bank resolution policy are presented in condensed form. Thirdly, the bank 
resolution policy is briefly evaluated. In the fourth and final section, the relevance of the 
Swedish experience for other countries is considered by making a comparison between the 
Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s and the current global financial crisis. The paper 
concludes with a summary. 
 
 
1. The anatomy of the financial crisis of the early 1990s
2 
 
The Swedish banking crisis was part of a major crisis that hit the Swedish economy in 1991-
92. The main impulse driving the boom-bust, which ended in a deep crisis, is found in the 
process of financial liberalization. The main deregulatory measure was taken in November 
1985, which was when the quantitative restrictions on the volume of bank lending were  
 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited significantly from constructive comments by Emil Ems and Göran Lind, who dealt 
with bank resolution policies in the Riksbank during the 1991-93 financial crisis. Magnus Astberg, Lars 
Heikensten, Andrea Schaechter, Garry Schinasi, Elemer Tertak, Gabriel Urwitz, Claes Wihlborg and Lars 
Wohlin have given valuable suggestions. The author's experience as chief economic advisor to prime minister 
Carl Bildt in 1992-94 is a source of inspiration for this paper.  
2 This section is based on several studies, among others Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998), Englund (1999), 
Englund and Vihriälä (2009), Jonung (2008) and Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009). 
  2abolished. At that time, the Swedish currency, the krona, was pegged to a basket of foreign 
currencies.  
 
Financial liberalization fundamentally affected the incentives of lenders and borrowers. After 
decades of non-price credit rationing, when interest rates were set below market rates and 
credit was allocated according to political preferences, commercial banks and savings banks 
were suddenly able to expand their lending without being hampered by regulatory restrictions. 
They entered into a fierce competition for market shares by freely offering loans to 
households and firms.  
 
A lending boom started in 1985-86, channeling credit to asset markets - primarily to housing, 
as well as to commercial real estate and to the stock market. The process was fuelled by rising 
inflation and a tax system that favored borrowing, resulting in negative real after-tax rates. As 
a result, there was a rapid increase in asset prices. They formed the basis for rising collateral 
values and the increasing net wealth of households, further fuelling the credit expansion. 
Within a couple of years, the aggregate credit volume had increased at an unprecedented 
speed.  
 
These financial developments impacted on the real economy. The macroeconomic outcome 
was a strong boom in 1988-89, characterized by overfull employment, rising consumption and 
falling private savings ratios, which eventually turned negative. The current account balance 
worsened as export performance weakened and imports rose. 
 
Due to the pegged exchange rate for the krona, monetary policy was prevented from 
mitigating the boom through interest rate increases. Fiscal policies were not sufficiently 
tightened to arrest the boom, although national budgets posted large surpluses due to rising 
tax revenues from higher consumption, wages, property values and capital gains. 
 
The boom in the real economy was eventually halted in 1989-90 and turned into a bust as a 
result of a combination of events, both international and domestic. Real interest rates rose 
internationally as a result of the contractionary German monetary policy following German 
reunification. Rising German interest rates exerted strong upward pressure on Swedish 
interest rates, as the krona was pegged to the ecu - the virtual European currency unit - in May 
1991. An additional real interest rate shock emerged when the Swedish central bank, the 
  3Riksbank, raised nominal interest rates to defend the pegged krona rates against recurring 
speculative attacks in 1989-92.  
 
Other policy measures increased the real after-tax interest rate. The far-reaching tax reform of 
1990-91, dubbed “the tax reform of the century”, significantly lowered marginal taxes and 
reduced the tax deductibility of mortgage rates, in this way raising real after-tax interest rates. 
Consequently, borrowing became less attractive, while private savings became more 
attractive. A rapid and not altogether expected decline in the rate of consumer price inflation 
in 1990-92 contributed to the sharp rise in real interest rates. Within a couple of years, real 
after-tax interest rates rose to levels that were much higher than borrowers had anticipated a 
few years earlier – for many households from about minus 5 per cent to more than plus 5 per 
cent. 
 
This sharp increase in the real interest rate had a profound impact on financial markets. Asset 
price deflation surfaced when the value of real assets was reduced by rising real interest rates. 
Balance sheets turned fragile when asset values, primarily property prices, fell below 
collateral values. At the same time, the nominal values of debt remained unchanged. Wealth 
losses came to the fore, forcing an adjustment of portfolios, which led to falling private 
consumption, falling investments and rising private savings. 
 
The harder households and firms tried to improve their wealth position by selling assets and 
increasing savings, the deeper the crisis became. The sell-out of property forced down 
property prices which, in turn, triggered new sales. The number of bankruptcies increased at a 
dramatic rate. Stock market prices tumbled, in particular for firms engaged in the financial 
sector, in real estate and in construction. 
 
Investments fell, particularly in the construction sector. With prices for existing houses 
declining, demand for new construction evaporated. Unemployment soared. As the Swedish 
krona was overvalued due to high wage and price inflation during the preceding boom, the 
export sector encountered major problems in 1990-91. Tax revenues declined and public 
expenditures rose due to the workings of automatic stabilizers. The government budget 
deficit, and thus the ratio of government debt to GDP, increased dramatically.  
 
  4In the autumn of 1992, Sweden's financial system was rocked when the Swedish krona was 
exposed to major speculative attacks. The Riksbank vigorously defended the peg with high 
overnight rates. For a very brief period in September the overnight rate was 500 percent. The 
defence of the peg by the Riksbank was supported by a set of "crisis packages", or fiscal 
austerity measures, presented jointly by the Centre-Right government and the Social 
Democratic opposition. 
 
The Swedish policy to maintain the pegged krona rate attracted international attention. No 
other country showed such determination to keep its exchange rate pegged. Many currencies 
with a pegged rate were victims of speculative attacks in September 1992. Great Britain, Italy 
and Finland all caved in and were forced to adopt a floating exchange rate, while Sweden 
managed to stay on its peg.  
 
Why was the pegged exchange rate of the krona so vigorously defended by the Swedish 
political establishment in autumn 1992? This policy is best explained by the lessons that 
economists and politicians drew from the devaluations of the krona - five in total - during the 
second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. The common opinion among both economists 
and policy-makers was that these devaluations had not resolved the long-run economic 
problems, but merely concealed them in the short run, while leading the Swedish economy 
into a process of devaluation cycles. A hard currency policy based on a firm peg was seen as 
the proper strategy of breaking with the devaluations of the past. The idea was that the pegged 
rate should act as the nominal anchor for stabilization polices and serve as a means to achieve 
low inflation and thus create a proper climate for growth and employment.
3  
 
The general ignorance of the workings of financial markets, of the role of portfolio 
imbalances and of boom-bust patterns is an additional reason why the pegged exchange rate 
was defended so energetically. Policy-makers and economists in Sweden did not understand 
that the financial deregulation of the 1980s fundamentally changed the prerequisites for the 
pegged exchange rate policy as it allowed for speculative capital flows. The crisis therefore 
                                                 
3 See Jonung (2008) and Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009) on the debate on the choice of exchange rate regime 
for Sweden in the 1980s.   




The defence of the krona lasted until November 19, 1992, when speculative attacks forced the 
Riksbank to let the krona float. The floating of the krona, with the ensuing depreciation and 
receding domestic interest rates, halted the downturn of the Swedish economy. The recovery 
began in 1993 and lasted for more than a decade. The main engine behind the recovery was an 
impressive growth in exports.  
 
Compared to the record of all major crises in Swedish economic history, the crisis of the 
1990s was one of the most costly in terms of output, industrial production and employment 
foregone. Only the crisis of the 1930s caused a bigger loss in real income than the crisis of the 
1990s. Employment was particularly hard hit during the 1990s. The cumulative employment 
loss is the largest on record – higher than during the Great Depression of the 1930s.
5  
 
The crisis undermined the financial system and threatened the existence of major banks. This 





2. The Swedish model for bank resolution 
 
The approach used by the Swedish authorities developed piecemeal. There was no grand 
scheme available before the banking and currency crisis of the early 1990s. Initially, most 
measures were taken on an ad hoc basis. Eventually, as the crisis started to emerge as a major 
threat to the economy, policy-makers were forced to respond in a more consistent manner. 
This process developed into the Swedish model for bank resolution.  
 
                                                 
4 This is seen from the memoirs of several policy-makers, most prominently by Bengt Dennis, governor of the 
Riksbank 1982-1994. See Dennis (1998). See also Jennergren (2002) and Jonung, Kiander and Vartia (2009) on 
the reasons why financial market participants and policy-makers did not respond to the asset boom until it was 
too late. 
5 See Jonung and Hagberg (2009).  
6 Sweden’s neighbours Finland and Norway were hit by financial crisis roughly at the same time as Sweden, 
triggering government measures to salvage the financial system. These steps, some of which were similar to 
those taken in Sweden, did not attract the same international interest as the Swedish bank resolution policy. See 
Englund and Vihriälä (2009) for Finland and Steigum (2009) for Norway.  
  6In retrospect, the Swedish model for bank resolution consisted of several features. We can 
regard the core of the model as comprising the following seven elements.
7 
 
1. Political unity 
 
A central feature of the Swedish model was the political unity underlying the bank resolution 
policy from the very start. This unity was initially created by the determination of the political 
parties to defend the pegged exchange rate of the krona, and it persisted throughout the crisis. 
The Centre-Right government and the political opposition - the Social Democrats - joined 
forces and avoided making the banking crisis a party political issue.  
 
The leadership of both political camps knew that behind the crisis lay a legacy of policy 
measures taken by two successive governments, first by the Social Democratic government of 
1982-91 that initiated the financial deregulation in the mid-1980s and subsequently introduced 
policy changes that caused the sharp increase in real interest rates and, secondly, by the 
Centre-Right government that came into power in the election of autumn 1991, inheriting 
both the financial imbalances of the boom years and the ensuing bust and emerging 
depression.  
 
Political unity eased the passage through parliament of measures to support the financial 
system. In addition, representatives of the opposition had a full insight into the resolution 
process, thus maintaining political accord. The agreement between the government and the 
opposition lent credibility to the actions of the government and of the Riksbank. Political unity 
was most necessary in terms of adopting a swift, decisive and lasting approach. 
 
2. Blanket guarantee of bank deposits and liabilities 
 
The Swedish government, in cooperation with the opposition, announced in a press release on 
September 24, 1992 – a critical month when the currency pegs in several European countries 
were successfully attacked – that depositors and other counterparties of Swedish commercial 
banks and Swedish financial institutions in which the State was involved were to be fully 
                                                 
7 The following account is based on among others Andersson and Viotti (1999), Berg (1998), Bäckström (1997), 
Dennis (1998), Englund (1999), Englund and Vihriälä (2009), Heikensten (1998a and b) and Ingves and Lind 
(1996, 1998 and 2008) and Lundgren (1998). 
  7protected from any future losses on their claims. According to the press release, the 
government was going to ask the parliament, the Riksdag, to agree on a complete legislation 
package later that autumn to address the financial turmoil. An outline of the expected 
measures was included in the press release. See Appendix 1 for the English version of the 
press release.  
 
The press release declared that the purpose of the blanket guarantee was that "households, 
enterprises and other holders of claims can feel secure" (see Appendix 1). However, the 
immediate reason for the press release was actually the fear of losing foreign financing 
facilities. Swedish banks were heavily dependent on foreign financing of their activities. 
Short-term foreign borrowing represented about 40 per cent of total bank borrowing. If this 




For the policy-makers there was no alternative but to issue a blanket guarantee to support the 
krona. In the currency turmoil, where speculation had forced the central banks of the United 
Kingdom, Finland and Spain, among others, to let their currencies float, the peg of the krona 
came under heavy speculative pressure. The blanket guarantee - already a drastic measure in 
itself - was thus an attempt to eliminated foreign fears that Swedish commercial banks would 
not be able to meet their financial obligations. The guarantee was successful in the sense that 
foreign confidence in the solvency of the Swedish commercial banks remained intact.  
 
In addition, this stop-gap measure proved highly beneficial, as it expanded the options for the 
Riksbank to support banks regardless of their financial position. Through the press release, the 
Riksbank was given the option to lend to any commercial bank operating in Sweden, even to 
those that were on the brink of insolvency, because the press release represented a State 
guarantee for the liabilities of the banks.  
 
In short, the blanket guarantee had clearly positive effects, as it came early during the 
Swedish financial crisis, as it prevented the likelihood of bank runs, from either international 
or domestic sources, and as it gave the Riksbank the opportunity to more actively support the 
                                                 
8 The government, through the National Debt Office, was prohibited to carry out any foreign net borrowing. This 
policy (valutalånenormen), launched in 1984, contributed to the private sector entering rapidly into foreign debt 
after the financial liberalization during the second half of the 1980s. 
  8banking system.
9 Bearing in mind that Sweden is a small, open economy, access to 
international financing was crucial after the abolishment of capital account controls in 1989.  
 
3. Swift policy action 
 
Once it was fully understood that a serious financial crisis was in the making, the government, 
the parliament and the Riksbank responded by taking decisive steps to support the financial 
system and, in particular, banks in distress. In this way the confidence of depositors and 
counterparties in the financial system was strengthened at an early stage of the financial crisis. 
This made it possible to maintain confidence throughout the resolution of the crisis at a 
relatively low political cost. Swift action kept any uncertainty regarding policy measures to a 
minimum.  
 
Of course, there was a risk that a rapid policy response might be too rapid, leading to 
inadequate measures that would have to be changed in due course. However, in hindsight, this 
risk proved worth taking. As a staff member of the Riksbank involved in the resolution 
process said: “It is more important to act early than to get it exactly right.” 
 
4. An adequate legal and institutional framework based on open-ended funding  
 
In December 1992, the Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag, passed legislation by an 
overwhelming majority and with no political infighting to establish a Bank Support Authority, 
Bankstödsnämnd, as envisaged in the press release of September 24, 1992. This step was 
taken when the crisis had deepened and it had emerged that not only the liquidity, but also the 
solvency of several commercial banks was at stake. The original stepwise, ad hoc approach 
now turned into a more systemic approach. 
 
The parliament decided that the Bankstödsnämnd was to be given open-ended funding, not a 
fixed predetermined budget. This was a deliberate choice in order to avoid the risk that the 
Bankstödsnämnd would be forced to go back to the Riksdag to ask for additional funding at a 
                                                 
9 A blanket guarantee per se by the government is not a sufficient criterion for success. Such guarantees may 
involve moral hazard and undesirable effects on competition. See Laeven and Valencia (2008b) for a survey of 
the use of blanket guarantees in banking crises.  
  9later stage.
10 The open-ended funding underpinned the credibility of the bank resolution 
policy. It clearly demonstrated that there were no political misgivings about the financial 
commitment to support the banking system.  
 
The Bankstödsnämnd was set up as an independent agency at a distance from the government, 
the Riksbank and the Finansinspektion (the financial supervisory authority). This construction 
fostered credibility and trust in its operations. The Social Democratic opposition was given 
full insight into its activities. It was staffed by professionals and it began operation in the 
spring of 1993, shortly after it was established.
11 It worked closely with the Riksbank, the 
Finansinspektion and the National Debt Office. In the few cases when these institutions were 
not in agreement, the Ministry of Finance acted as arbitrator.
12 
 
Through this legislation, the bank resolution policy was based on appropriate institutional 
framework and on open-ended funding. This was key to the success of the resolution policy.  
 
5. Full information disclosure  
 
From the very start, the Bankstödsnämnd sought to obtain a clear picture of the financial 
problems facing the financial institutions through due diligence. Even before it began its 
work, and in its early stages, it tried to draw - whenever appropriate - on the available 
expertise for dealing with ailing banks by consulting and using external experts, many of 
whom were recruited from abroad.  
 
Banks that turned to the Bankstödsnämnd with requests for support were obliged to give full 
disclosure of all their financial positions, opening their books completely to scrutiny. This 





                                                 
10 Here the experience of Finland served as a warning. The Finnish parliament had first settled for a limit to its 
bank support, which had to be revised later - at considerable political cost. 
11 Foreign firms like Arthur Andersen, McKinsey and Credit Suisse First Boston served as advisers to the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bankstödsnämnd. See Ingves and Lind (1998).  
12 See Ingves and Lind (2008). 
  106. Differentiated resolution policy to maintain the banking system and prevent moral 
hazard 
 
Banks that turned to the Bankstödsnämnd were dealt with in a way that minimised the moral 
hazard problem. In short, the aim was to save the banks – not the owners of the banks. By 
forcing owners of banks to absorb losses, public acceptance of the bank resolution was 
fostered. In this way, taxpayers were likely to feel that the policy was fair and just.  
 
The general strategy was to divide the banks into three categories, depending on whether the 
statutory capital adequacy ratio would be breached and, if so, whether this breach was 
temporary: The first category included those banks that might deteriorate towards the capital 
adequacy limit, but would subsequently be able to achieve enhanced solvency on their own; 
the second category covered those that may fall below the limit for a time, but would 
eventually recover; and the third category was for those that were beyond hope. Each of these 
three categories was treated differently by the Bankstödsnämnd.  
 
Category 1. The Bankstödsnämnd encouraged these institutions to find private sector 
solutions and to avoid public involvement as far as possible.
13 Shareholders were requested to 
inject additional capital where such an option was feasible. To facilitate this process, the 
Bankstödsnämnd was prepared to grant a temporary “capital adequacy” guarantee. Only one 
bank,  Handelsbanken, turned out not to need an injection of capital. Another bank, 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, chose to reinforce its capital base through a share issue 
aimed at its current shareholders, without having to apply for any public guarantees.  
 
Category 2. This category covered a bank with short-term problems, but with a good prospect 
of future profits that could be expected to restore solvency. In such cases, where private 
solutions may not be available, the Bankstödsnämnd was prepared to deploy more extensive 
support, including capital contributions or loans, in addition to the guarantee mentioned in 
category 1. Föreningsbanken was dealt with under this category, receiving a guarantee that 
the State would contribute share capital in case the capital adequacy ratio fell below 9 per 
cent. This guarantee proved not to be needed.
14 
                                                 
13 As part of the encouragement it was made clear to them that public involvement may necessitate an initial 
adjustment of private shareholder capital.  
14 See Ingves and Lind (1998). 
  11 
Category 3. This category embraced banks that were not expected to become profitable; their 
equity would gradually erode and ultimately become negative. This category required active 
State involvement, ultimately in the form of orderly liquidation of the ailing institution. 
However, if a more favourable result could be achieved with other methods, the 
Bankstödsnämnd was entitled to apply those as well, for instance by selling bad assets and 
consolidating the remainder of the bank, either on its own or through a merger with other 




Two bank asset management corporations (AMCs), Securum for Nordbanken and Retriva for 
Gotabanken, were set up to manage the bad debt (non-performing loans) of these two 
financial institutions as part of the resolution policy - as had been the case in other countries. 
A novel approach was adopted which involved splitting the assets of an ailing bank into 
"good" and "bad" assets, and then transferring the "bad" assets to the asset management 
corporation, principally to Securum.
16 In addition, when assets were placed under the 
administration of Securum and Retriva, they were assigned low market values in the due 
diligence process, effectively setting a floor for asset values. Because market participants did 
not expect prices to fall below this level, trading was maintained.
17  
 
In the long run, about 10-15 years, the two bank asset management corporations proved to be 
successful in the sense that the fiscal cost of supporting the financial system was roughly 
balanced by the revenues received through the liquidation of the asset holdings of the bank 
asset management corporations. 
 
7. The role of macroeconomic policies to end the crisis 
 
The bank resolution policy in Sweden was much facilitated by the design of monetary and 
fiscal policies to counteract the crisis once it peaked in the autumn of 1992. These measures 
allowed the Swedish economy, and hence the financial system, to recover fairly rapidly.  
                                                 
15 The deposits of the Gotabanken and the Nordbanken represented roughly 20 per cent of all deposits. 
16 See Bergström, Englund and Thorell (2002) and Heikensten (1998a and b). 
17 This is in sharp contrast to the Japanese policy of setting high values for "bad" assets, thus freezing the real 
estate market for about a decade.  
  12The fall of the pegged exchange rate of the krona on November 19, 1992 due to speculative 
attacks turned out to be an important move towards the recovery. This step was initially seen 
as a failure, indicating that the Riksbank and the government were unable to stick to the 
declared hard currency policy. Once the krona was floating, it depreciated sharply - by nearly 
30 per cent. The depreciation turned out to be long-lasting, to the surprise of economists who 
had expected a return of the pattern of previous devaluations of the krona when domestic 
price and wage increases eliminated in a few years the gain in competitiveness from the 
devalutions. 
 
The depreciation was the main driving force behind the recovery which started shortly 
thereafter in 1993. In the years that followed, exports became the engine of the Swedish 
economy. Between 1992 and 2008, exports roughly doubled as a share of GDP. There is no 
other period of similar positive export performance in Swedish economic history. Sweden's 
growth rate remained above the EU average for many years after the crisis.  
 
Once the krona was floating, monetary policy was able to focus on domestic conditions. The 
Riksbank declared an inflation target in January 1993 to be valid from 1995. The Riksbank 
gradually lowered interest rates, although critics claimed that the reductions were too 
cautious. The vicious circle of falling asset prices was arrested. The ensuing fall in interest 
rates eased the pressure on the banking system, as the economy started to recover. In July 
1996, the crisis legislation and the blanket guarantee were abolished.  
 
Fiscal policies were supportive too. The government allowed budget surpluses to accumulate 
during the run-up to the crisis and huge deficits to develop during the crisis, mainly as a result 
of the workings of automatic stabilizers. Figure 1 demonstrates that the boom in 1987-1990 
was associated with a budget surplus of around 4 per cent of GDP. This turned into a large 
and lasting deficit during the bust in 1991-97, peaking at almost 12 percent of GDP in 1993. 
The bank support policy was allowed to contribute to the rise in the deficit.
18 Viewed in an 
international context, see the budget deficit of the EA 12 in Figure 1, the development of the 
Swedish budget deficit was extraordinary, characterized by large amplitude.  
 
                                                 
18 The role of fiscal policy during the crisis is a contested issue. See Jonung (2008).  
  13In short, the rapid recovery of the Swedish economy greatly facilitated the bank resolution 
policy. As soon as the economy was expanding, pressure on the banking system started to 




3. Evaluating the Swedish bank resolution  
 
The Swedish bank resolution policy is commonly regarded as successful in the international 
policy debate, although there are no firm criteria on how to evaluate resolution policies.
20 One 
reason for this positive view is the fact that the banking system remained fairly intact; it 
continued to function during the crisis, there were no bank runs, hardly any signs of a credit 
crunch emerged, and the banking system was swift to move out of the crisis. The banking 
system remained largely privately owned and became profitable shortly after the crisis.
21  
 
The exceptions to this rosy picture are Nordbanken and Gotabanken. Nordbanken, previously 
a government-owned bank that was partially privatized (25 per cent) in the late 1980s, was re-
nationalized.  Gotabanken was taken over by the Government and amalgamated with the 
former Nordbanken after the default of the bank holding company, Gota AB. However, the 
consolidated Nordbanken was eventually privatized and emerged as a successful venture in 
the form of Nordea, now the only true pan-Nordic bank currently active in Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden.  
 
Another reason for taking a positive view of the Swedish approach is that the net fiscal cost, 
more commonly referred to as the 'cost to the taxpayer', turned out to be very low or even 
positive in the long run.
22 Figure 2, displaying the net fiscal costs for 39 systemic banking 
crises in the world in the period 1970-2007, demonstrates that Sweden ranks favourably with 
a net fiscal cost of close to zero. The gross fiscal cost for the bank support policy amounted to 
3.6 per cent of GDP initially.
23 By now, some 15 years after the crisis, the cost to the 
                                                 
19 See Englund and Vihriälä (2009). 
20 For positive assessments of the Swedish bank resolution approach, see among others Ergungor (2008). See 
also Calomiris, Klingebiel and Laeven (2004) for a survey of alternative crisis resolution policies, although these 
authors draw no firm conclusions about the optimum design of resolution policies.  
21 The Swedish record looks attractive compared to that of Japan, where the banking system remained in distress 
for a much longer period than in Sweden.  
22 The cost to society in terms of lost output, industrial production foregone and loss of employment was huge. 
See the summary in Jonung and Hagberg (2009).  
23 Data on gross and net fiscal costs are taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008a).  
  14taxpayers is likely to have been repaid after the liquidation of the assets that were taken over 
by government institutions. The best estimate available, at least so far, suggests that the fiscal 
outlays for supporting the banking sector were recovered.
24 However, there is no official 
estimate of the ultimate fiscal cost of the bank support policy to the taxpayer. 
 
The Swedish crisis management was also a domestic affair. No international organizations 
like the IMF were involved which probably contributed to public trust in the process.
25 
 
Nevertheless, mistakes were made along the way, although these have not received as much 
attention as the policy successes. For example, the Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Finansinspektionen) tightened the accounting rules as the crisis evolved, putting additional 
pressure on the banking system.
26 Complaints were made that firms with a good credit record 
were transferred to AMCs, thus left without an ordinary bank connection.
27 However, these 
mistakes are minor in comparison to the positive effect of the overall policy of managing the 
financial crisis.  
 
 
4. Can the Swedish model be exported? 
 
To what extent can the Swedish model be exported and applied to other countries today? To 
answer this question, the Swedish crisis of the early 1990s has to be compared to the present 
global crisis. There are considerable similarities and also considerable differences.  
 
On a very general level the similarities are striking. The causes of the two crises are similar. 
The impulse driving the boom that preceded the crisis can be traced to financial liberalization 
and financial innovations, setting off a credit boom that fuelled rapid increases in asset prices, 
in particular house prices. The boom was supported by lax monetary and fiscal policies. The 
                                                 
24 The most complete and updated attempt to evaluate the cost and returns to the taxpayers is presented by 
Christner and Hagbjer (2007). Building on the work by Jennergren and Näslund (1998), they take the support 
paid by the government during the acute phase of the crisis as a starting point and then estimate the revenues 
from the selling of the "bad" assets taken over by the government. They conclude that "the Swedish government 
has neither lost nor gained any significant amount from the subsidies" once given to the banking system. 
25 IMF took indirectly a part in the policy of defending the peg for the krona in 1992 by recommending budget 
consolidation. See Dennis (1998, p. 64) and Jonung (2008).  
26 See Urwitz (1998, p. 63). The changes in the rules were reasonable per se. The problem was that the 
evaluation methods should have been changed before, not during, the crisis.  
27  Representatives from small business also complained that commercial banks unduly cut off credit to viable 
firms forcing unnecessary bankruptcies and forced sales.  
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supervision and regulations were inadequate to prevent the boom and the emergence of large 
financial imbalances.  
 
Eventually, boom turned into bust - with a declining volume of credit, deleveraging, falling 
asset prices, and distress in the financial system, bringing the threat of bankruptcy of major 
financial institutions, and triggering heavy government intervention to support the banking 
system. The financial crisis impacted on the real economy, initiating a deep recession. 
 
On the other hand, there are also considerable differences between the Swedish crisis of the 
1990s and the current global financial crisis. Most important, the initial conditions for Sweden 
compared to those of most other countries today are significant. The Swedish crisis of the 
early 1990s was primarily a local phenomenon, or – more accurately - a Nordic one, as 
Finland and Norway also went into crisis at roughly the same time as Sweden.  
 
Sweden, being a small open economy with a pegged exchange rate when the crisis peaked, 
was able to abandon the pegged rate in November 1992, thus obtaining a significant and 
lasting depreciation of its currency that contributed to a strong and prolonged recovery out of 
the crisis. This option of an export-oriented growth strategy out of the crisis is currently not 
open to the world, because the present crisis is a global one. An individual country can no 
longer rely on the rest of the world to maintain aggregate demand for its exports, as Sweden 
was able to do in the 1990s. Sweden had the advantage of being a small player that could rely 
upon the stability of the rest of the world to support its domestic recovery.  
 
The small size of the Swedish financial system in the 1990s facilitated the bank resolution 
policy. Policy-makers had to deal with a limited number of banks - only six major banks, in 
fact - in a global environment of trust in the banking system and in financial markets (except 
for the Nordics). The Swedish system was also bank-based, with few major financial actors 
outside the banking system. This is in sharp contrast to the United States today, for example, 
where there are a large number of banks of different types and many non-bank financial actors 




The Swedish bank resolution policy was also confronted by a financial system that was much 
less sophisticated and much less globalized than the financial systems of today. There were no 
structured products, no sophisticated derivatives, hardly any hedge funds, a more limited 
supply of financial instruments, less securization etc. Structured products were not traded in 
local and global markets, re-leveraged to create other securities, and then traded again. While 
bank leverage and institutional leverage played an important role in Sweden in the early 
1990s and continue to do so, the market leverage and degree of complex and opaque 
securitization today is quite different from the situation in Sweden in the late-1980s.  
 
In short, the Swedish financial system was much more transparent than is currently the case in 
most countries. Now, the lack of transparency has prevented the rise of a properly functioning 
interbank market, giving rise to large interbank spreads and a liquidity crisis, in spite of 
various government guarantees in several countries. A liquidity crisis of this type did not 
emerge in Sweden in the early 1990s, because the banking system remained transparent 
thanks to the work of the Bankstödsnämnd. 
 
The ongoing global crisis is a banking crisis as well as a financial market crisis, by contrast 
with the Swedish crisis, which was primarily a banking crisis, and only later became a 
currency crisis – thus turning into a “traditional” twin crisis when the krona came under attack 
by speculators. In particular, both local and global systemically-important markets serving the 
short-term liquidity and funding needs for a wide range of financial institutions and hybrid 
financial-non-financial companies, like General Electric and other companies that rely heavily 
on the commercial paper market, have been under severe stress – and at times not functioning 
at all – since the advent of the US subprime crisis in the summer of 2007.
  
 
Indeed, on this score, the ongoing crisis has been difficult for the authorities to manage, in 
part because some traditional central banking tools – particularly in the United Kingdom and 
the United States – are not well suited, either legally or architecturally, to provide liquidity for 
                                                 
28 Wages and bonuses paid to bankers created a public outcry in Sweden as well in the 1990s, thus becoming a 
problem for policy-makers during the management of the financial crisis. Several attempts were made by the 
government to recover remuneration paid out by Nordbanken, but failed. See Lundgren (1998, p. 11). 
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event, authorities had to innovate in order to provide large amounts of liquidity, but were 
unable to immediately restore trust and confidence to major market participants. By contrast, 
the Swedish blanket guarantee of September 1992 immediately created trust; one reason for 
this was the comparatively simple set of instruments available compared to the present case.  
 
In addition, Sweden has a long tradition of confidence in its domestic institutions, in its 
political system and in its elected representatives.
29 With this large social capital, it is easier 
for the government and the opposition to reach agreement on public policy actions that are 
stable and lasting. The tradition of open public debate makes it easier for policy-makers to 
explain difficult and costly decisions to the public and to be trusted. Trust contributed to the 
belief that the Bankstödsnämnd was going to carry out its duties in a fair and correct way 
without favouring any of the parties involved. It may be difficult for other countries to 
mobilize the same type of social capital that was needed in order to make the Swedish 
approach successful.  
 
The financial crisis hit Sweden in September 1992 – less than a year after the election in 
October 1991. As the next election was due to take place in October 1994, politicians were 
probably more inclined to cooperate across the standard political divides than in the case of an 
immediate election as in the fall of 2008 in the US.  
 
Today, as a result of the global financial crisis, there is much more genuine uncertainty about 
the international financial architecture, about the regulation of the financial system and about 
the proper strategy for central banking than was the case in the early 1990s. The Swedish 
policy-makers of yesterday designed their bank resolution policies in a more stable 
macroeconomic and financial global setting.  
 
The above account of the differences between Sweden in the early 1990s and the global 
situation today suggests that it was far easier for policy-makers to deal with a local financial 
crisis in a small open economy like Sweden's in the past than it is today to manage a global 
crisis characterised by strong and sophisticated financial and economic cross-border links. 
The international financial linkages suggest a need for international cooperation, in particular 
                                                 
29 The strong role of public trust in Sweden compared to the case of East Asia during the banking crises of the 
1990s is highlighted by Kokko and Suzuki (2009).  
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greater challenges, the Swedish model of bank resolution can nevertheless serve as a source of 
inspiration – indeed as a benchmark or template – for countries facing financial crisis.  
 
 
5. Summary  
 
The financial system is based on trust. History demonstrates that a deep financial crisis, like 
the one that hit Sweden in the early 1990s, is associated with a severe lowering of confidence 
in the liquidity and solvency of the banking system. Under such circumstances, the goal of 
economic policy should be to ensure public confidence in the workings of the financial sector, 
thereby arresting the melt-down and paving the way for recovery. The way to do this is to 
inject capital into the financial system, and to recapitalize banks and other institutions, 
because the private sector is not able to do so in the short run – only the public sector has this 
capacity. The policy of public support should be designed such that is perceived as efficient, 
fair and just by the public. Once the public believes that the financial system is stabilized, 
trust will return. 
 
In short, the task of government, or - in popular terms - the task of the taxpayer, should be to 
serve as the capitalist or investor of last resort in order to rescue the financial system, thus 
preventing the financial breakdown from having severe and lasting effects on the real 
economy. In addition, trust is also based on the general performance of the real economy. 
Saving the financial system should be carried out at the same time as policies are in place to 
improve overall economic conditions.  
 
The approach adopted to address the solvency issue during financial crises differs from one 
crisis-hit country to another. In the early 1990s, the Swedish government designed an 
approach that drew plaudits. The conclusions from the Swedish experience for other countries 
facing a banking crisis must be that the process of support to the financial system would gain 
from having a basis of political unity, speed and transparency. It should minimize moral 
hazard by being implemented within an open, consistent and all-encompassing strategy, and 
have a legal and institutional framework where the administration of the support is left to 
experts acting at arm's length from the government, the central bank and the financial 
supervisory authority. The support should be open-ended and its aims should be, first, to 
  19guarantee both the liabilities of banks and, second, to ensure the solvency of the financial 
system by a system of recapitalization of banks. The support should be so designed as to 
appear fair and just to the public. Moral hazard should be kept at a minimum by avoiding bail-
outs of shareholders.  
 
These conclusions from the Swedish case are easy to summarize. However, when exporting 
them to other countries, attention should be paid to differences in initial conditions. A detailed 
knowledge of institutions, legislation and political conditions in the country involved is 
needed. The Swedish model of bank resolution can be used as a general template for countries 
facing financial crisis, but these countries will need to adapt the details of the implementation 
to their own circumstances 
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Note: Net fiscal costs are government outlays during the crisis (e.g. for recapitalisation) minus 
recovery values during period t to t+5, where t is the first year of the crisis. Gross fiscal costs 
are used for Spain, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey (1998).  
Source: Data compiled by Andrea Schaechter from Laeven and Valencia (2008a).  
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